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In today’s computing environment, data is moving to central locations and most computers
are merely used to access the data. Today is the era of cloud computing and distributed
computing, where users have control over neither data nor computation. As this trend
continues there is an increasing frequency of mutually distrustful parties being forced to
interact and share resources with each other in potentially dangerous situations.
Therefore, there is an urgent need for a means of creating trust between two entities, or
at the very least providing some means of determining the trust level of a given machine.
Current approaches to the trust problem focus on various forms of isolation and attes-
tation, but most have high overheads or are overly rigid in their requirements to users. I
propose and implement an alternative solution which provides flexible, on-demand contain-
ers for untrusted applications, and enforcement of requested security properties. Together
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In the world of computing today, much of the vital interaction is done over the network, with
machines we can neither see nor fully interact with. Sometimes we own and have root access
over those machines, and sometimes we have no privileged access whatsoever. Regardless of
the ownership we have, there are a number of occasions when knowing the state of the other
machine is not only a positive but a necessity, as a means of determining whether we can
trust the interactions performed remotely.
The level of knowledge required varies between users: one may wish only to interact with
non-Windows machines, or machines with the latest security and anti-virus software, thus
hopefully providing some assurance that they will not infect the client with a virus or other
malware. At a more complicated level, however, the requirements can become quite subtle.
“I want X amount of run time” or “I need access to files in this order” or even “These files
should never be open at the same time”. Even more complicated is when these requirements
do not mesh well with the security concerns of the host: “This client needs to be able to
interact over the internet, but I want to know what is going out”. Given the flexibility
of hardware, operating systems, and application-level software running on machines today,
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there are an almost infinite number of permutations and levels of inspection and trust within
the machine.
Users, therefore, are left with a problem: they need to trust the computation of these
machines, and in order to do so they must trust the computers themselves. In order to trust
a computer, they must have some idea of state, but the possible states are too many to
plausibly keep track of.
Trusted Computing is an oft-used term with many varied meanings. The context in which
we employ it here is that of the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) [2]. Trusted Computing,
as put forward by the TCG, is one method of approaching this trust problem, which starts
from a small core of trusted hardware/software and expands that core via any of a number
of methods. Doing so has a number of benefits: chief among them the concept that such
an expansion provides a level of trust about the operation of the machine. Having either
mutual trust or a means of evaluation allows untrusted parties to make informed decisions
about if and to what degree they wish to interact with each other.
The common thread of Trusted Computing research leads people to use the trusted core
to make measurements (or audits) of the computer state and attach various items to that
state—whether those actions are secrets such as cryptographic keys or trust evaluations
connecting to human ideas of safety. These connections provide additional assurance to a
remote user. However, creating a useful audit of a system is difficult, because it must be
accessible, meaningful, and useful to remote machines. Open machines currently have such
flexibility in both software and hardware that determining what to audit is difficult, and
the alternative of a closed and locked-down system is overly restrictive. (In this context,
closed systems are those which are restricted to a fixed set of easily auditable and trustable
hardware and software.)
There are several potential solutions to this problem. Compartmented attestation has
been proposed, but the complexity of auditing such an approach is only slightly better than
that of an open system [16, 18]. Compartmented attestation creates a sandbox for the
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program and controls the access using Mandatory Access Control (MAC) from SELinux.
The MAC policies used to isolate each compartment, however, are complicated to create
and proving one compartment on a system requires proof of the entire system: not a huge
improvement over previous methods.
An alternative, property-based attestation allows the host to create a profile that describes
the behavior of the system, rather than the system configuration [24, 12]. However, the
vagueness of such an approach does not decrease the potential complexity to any appreciable
degree, and may in fact increase it via the translation between system configuration and
human-readable properties.
Virtualization has been explored as a means of limiting the necessary software to audit,
however, the current solutions are neither flexible nor scalable, requiring a pre-fabricated
virtual machine with its own OS and specific software [26, 10, 9, 12]. Alternatively, they
may make some repeated attempts at creating an acceptable security setting through trial
and error. While the former approach seems reasonable, the load of creating a full OS on
top of the virtual machine is difficult to do and hard to verify. The latter approach is simply
frustrating.
We discuss these and other approaches in more detail in section 1.2.
This thesis aims to create a combination of flexible trusted computing with OS-level
virtualization as a means of creating compartmented attestation on demand. Virtualization
not only provides a means of isolation, but it limits the software necessary to audit, and
creates a limited set of routes into the compartment. The OpenSolaris zones which I use
in this project not only provide a more lightweight structure for on-demand computing (by
sharing the operating system), but they also provide tools such as DTrace and other run-
time instrumentation which allow for virtual machine introspection and dynamic property
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Figure 1.1: Summary of pros and cons of previous solutions.
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1.2 Background on Trusted Computing
Trusted Computing is a vague concept which has historically been used in a variety of ways.
For the purposes of this project, however, a computer can be “trusted” if there is some way
to verify that it acts in the way it should, either currently or for some period of time. This
verification must, to some degree, know the state of both hardware and software, for neither
alone can provide assurance of the operation of the machine. In this vein, I have relied
heavily upon the TCG’s specifications for trusted computing in both hardware and software
levels.
The difficulty behind trusted computing traditionally lies within a handful of areas:
1. What can we trust to evaluate the machine for us and determine trustworthiness?
2. What should we evaluate within the machine?
3. How we can we reconcile the difference between the automated and machine-accessible
evaluation and a human-readable or intuitive trust judgements?
Although there are many approaches to trusted computing and numerous projects which
address the questions outlined above, none of them unifies the answers to these problems in
any optimal way.
Below, we take a moment to consider each approach.
1.2.1 Trusted Hardware
Trusted Hardware, being the lowest level of base assumption you can make, is often the go-to
method for establishing a root of trust for the machine and subsequent operations. I also
make use of trusted hardware—a Trusted Platform Module, to be specific—which is further
discussed in section 3
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1.2.2 Attestation
Attestation was one of the first attempts at answering the problems of trusted computing.
It is the process by which a computer, workstation, or user attempts to verify the state of a
machine. State may include hardware capabilities, operating system, installed software, or
more complicated run-time statistics. The main way this is done is via some measurement of
relevant hardware, software, and operating systems. However, determining what is actually
necessary to evaluate is complicated, and frequently debated. Deciding what the evaluation
will be applied to determines what level of detail we must attend to.
To provide a fully accurate description of the state of a machine requires an audit of the
entire computer. However, that full audit may not be entirely necessary in every situation,
and makes interpretation much more complex. Different applications use different measure-
ments but distilling the measurements down is not a simple task: an attestation mechanism
must be general enough to satisfy a wide range of security and measurement demands while
still remaining fast and lightweight enough to useful in real-time computation. The line is a
fine one.
Getting a meaningful measurement out of the machine is also quite complicated, due
to the open nature of contemporary computers—in which there countless combinations of
hardware, operating systems, and applications which may or may not interact during any
given operations. The variability creates both numerous holes which must be checked, and
a wide variety of redundant information generated in any software measurement. Thus, to
evaluate the full audit of a machine provides both too much information, and information
which does not easily relate to an intuitive concept of safe or appropriate use for humans.
On the other hand, to mandate a specific system is to overly restrict the user to a very
specific and limited arrangement which may not fulfill the requirements for functionality
on the machine. The demand for legacy application is a single stunning example of the
human inability to switch their methodology or pattern of behavior, even in the face of
motivating evidence: security solutions are most successful when they ease users into changes.
12
Additionally, the straight cost of moving to such a restricted system would be enormous
in software—and potentially hardware—development costs, considering the level of custom
software inherent in many fields.
Thus, the current methods of attestation provide no good solution to the problems of what
and how much and how to evaluate the system, although the idea has significant potential.
1.2.3 Isolation: Compartmented Attestation
Some researchers have proposed the idea of compartmented attestation to limit the amount
of data and software stack that needs to be evaluated for security reasons [16, 18]. By using
Security Enhanced Linux (SE Linux) and mandatory access control (MAC) systems, they
propose to isolate specific compartments of the platform. MAC uses a security monitor to
control access to specific entities. By using this property to create sandboxes for secure
programs they limit access to the given compartment, as well as the material that needs to
be attested to in order to verify the state of the machine.
However, the policy creation needed to appropriately isolate various compartments is
highly complex, and revealing the state of the MAC system in relation to a single compart-
ment entails revealing the state of a large portion of the platform. While sandboxing is an
idea I would like to bring forward and MAC is a good preliminary means of doing so, I
believe that there are additional approaches which produce less overhead for the system and
the associated attestation.
1.2.4 Property-based Attestation
Property-based attestation is a variant of the attestation approach that focuses on categoriz-
ing system behavior, rather than system setup [24, 12]. Rather than evaluating dependent on
certain operating systems or applications, this approach seeks to evaluate certain properties
of the system itself. This has the advantage of coming closer to attestation that makes sense
to users and their trust evaluations. However, it makes a number of assumptions leading
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to an inconclusive solution. Firstly, they rely on a Trusted Third Party (TTP) to take a
system setup and make it into a list of properties. Secondly, they simplify their design by
assuming that the OS is policy neutral. The design of this approach suffers from both an
overwhelming level of knowledge about the system, which someone must convert to attesta-
tion, and from an assumption that an external computing source can make the majority of
these evaluations.
1.2.5 Virtualization
Virtualization has been used to implement alternate forms of compartmented attestation
in specific cases. Virtualization often works by having a pre-established image of a virtual
machine that is loaded and starts running only when necessary [26, 10, 9, 12]. It is an ideal
approach, since virtualization often has isolation built in to the design so that each virtual
machine is (ideally) unaware it does not have dedicated hardware. This isolation quality
nicely replicates the idea of compartmented attestation in a more well-defined way. Addi-
tionally, the built-in features of virtualization often provide some means of monitoring the
virtual machines and a layer of restrictions between the platform and the virtual machines.
For example, it is often trivial to shut off network access to a virtual machine, or control the
mounted file systems in the machine.
However, the prior work in this area has a few specific issues. Firstly; the systems do not
scale well to instances where more than one dedicated application or OS is used on the sys-
tem. Because of the way the virtual machine images are created, they do not account for the
increased application stack when operating systems are used, one on top of another, in the
virtual machines, nor do they generalize their checks to an environment where multiple appli-
cations or types of containers may be required. Secondly, they require significant negotiation
for security specifications in immediate circumstances (where the virtual machine is not pre-
arranged). In the case where an image does not already exist, they provide no methodology
for dealing with negotiation for a new security VM, or proving security assurance about that
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VM, which leads to trial and error being the default method of choice. Thirdly, they do not
account for the still-monstrous attestation needed when each virtual machine has its own
software stack needing verification. Because most virtualization methods lead to an increase
in the amount of software on the stack between operating system, virtual machine monitor,
and the operating system within the VM, even before the attestation gets to application
software itself, the efficiency of requiring these machines to run in virtual environments is
not clear: the benefits of running in a virtual machine provide isolation and a limit to the
breadth of the attestation needs, but add significantly to the overhead and the depth of the
attestation needs.
1.2.6 Computing on Demand
Several researchers have considered the concept of Trusted Computing on Demand, which op-
erates under the philosophy that we should only provide the attestation for those tasks/environments
which call for it [4, 20, 18]. This optimization allows the user to operate with both greater
freedom and greater efficiency when they are willing to also accept greater risk, or forgo par-
ticipating in activities requiring a high level of trust. They suggested selecting at boot-time
the need for a trusted machine, and carried out the auditing at that point in the boot process
[26]. This creates an average increase in the efficiency of operations of everyday actions, as
well as allowing users the choice of what risks they wish to accept. However, due to the need
to reboot every time a change in status occurs, and the still-inconvenient task of auditing
an entire system, the option is less-than ideal and provides a minimal set of benefits.
1.3 Proposed Solution
The solution I propose is a variant on the approaches of virtualization and trusted computing
on demand, although it pulls ideas from most of the approaches to trusted computing. The
tools run on OpenSolaris and provide a networked interface for lightweight virtual machines
15
Approach Benefits Drawbacks
Attestation 1. Provides a measurement of
the machine state
1. Too difficult to distill to
a meaningful value while main-
taining generality
Property Based Attestation
1. Provides subtler distinctions
to the attestation.
1. Difficult to quantify.
2. Provides more coherence be-
tween the human-desired traits
and the computer-provided sys-
tem configuration
2. Introduces cost of translation
and enforcement.
Compartmented Attestation
1. Provides a rigid set of con-
trols into and out of the com-
partment.
1. difficult to maintain the MAC
policies.
2. Reduces to smaller subset of
materials to measure.
2. Does not significantly im-
prove upon the audit complexity
Virtualization
1. Provides isolation to the se-
cure applications
1. Fails to scale well to multiple
applications or systems
2. Provides built-in mechanisms
to inspect the compartments
2. Adds bulkiness to the attes-
tation
3. Lacking in flexibility
Computing on Demand
1. Allows users to take the cost
of attestation only when neces-
sary.
1. Provides a large overhead for
switching.
2. Does not significantly im-
prove upon the audit complexity
Virtual Container Attestation
1. Provides little overhead for
both isolation and flexibility
2. Provides mechanisms for run-
time analysis and inspection of
the compartments
Table 1.1: Summary of approaches to the trusted computing problem
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to be created and destroyed on command, eliminating much of the overhead of the platform-
wide trusted computing on demand, as well as preserving the isolation of virtualization and
adding a flexibility in setup that allows a larger variety of applications to be run on the
virtual machines.
The virtual machines embedded in that operating system (called containers, or zones)
are ideal for our purposes: by sharing the underlying operating system, in addition to much
of the common files and utilities, they are (theoretically) both more lightweight to start up
and more easily attested to.
1.3.1 Goals of Virtual Container Attestation
The solution we implemented provides a central virtual machine monitor (VMM) which
doubles as a security monitor. This VMM has five main parts.
1. It intercepts commands to the zone (or controlling the zone) from within the operating
system or users logged into the machine itself and redirects them to the VMM-specific
versions, which have more checks and logging capabilities, particularly for container
creation.
2. It accepts zone commands over an SSL-based service, and redirects those commands
to the VMM-specific versions. Additionally, this SSL server provides the means for
external clients to interact with non-networked zones.
3. It monitors specific attributes of the system and containers and halts zones which do
not comply with the requested attributes. Such attributes are requested at creation-
time.
4. It employs PKI as a means of providing attestation via property-attributed certificates
that may be revoked to negate the attestation: asserting that the user can no longer
trust the zone to have that property and comply to the requested policy.
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5. It utilizes secure hardware—the Trusted Platform Module—to ensure ensure that zones
whose certs have been revoked cannot continue to attest or to operate within the
system.
The more specific design features of the tools are discussed in section 4.
1.  Zone creation (Solaris)
2.  Extend attestation (TPM)
3.  Start enforcement of attributes 
(dTrace)






1. Zone does something to violate 
attributes
2. Enforcement detects violation
3. Shut down zone, cut off access 
to attestation
Notify client of 
violation
1. Command forwarded to zone
2. Zone attestation checked
3.  Attribute enforcement checked
4. Reply forwarded to client
(Repeat as needed)
Communication 




Figure 1.2: Client functionality provided by our solution.
1.3.2 Previous Work in this Direction, and Contributions of this
Thesis
Members of the lab community at Dartmouth have begun work in this direction previously.
John Baek and Evan Tice brought the project to the point where there was a fairly solid
SSL service to create zones over the network, as well as an interface with which to interact
with the zones, once created, and send them commands.
This thesis modifies the services provided and takes the project further by creating prop-
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erty enforcement for the zones in a number of areas, tying that to the TPM, and utilizing a
Certificate Authority to bring the remote zone creation to the formalized attestation prob-
lem, making it a more realistic and reliable solution to the trust problem, rather then merely
a utility for remote zone creation.
Additionally, the thesis builds functioning prototypes for a handful of power grid appli-




As discussed in the introduction, this project has applications throughout computing, and
an increase in distributed or cloud computing leads to increasing demands for good solutions
to the trust problem. Any situation where the protection of data and computation is vital to
both parties is one in which our solution, Virtual Container Attestation would be appropriate.
This project could be useful in almost any area of computing, and certainly within
distributed computing. However, the applications I focus on in this project are those of the
power grid entities, who must, by nature of the grid, have interactions with other entities of
whom they are inherently distrustful.
2.1 Power Grid Background
The power grid, as it is currently run in North America, is administrated by a number of
large corporate entities, each of whom may run a variety of different facilities. These facilities
include generators, substations, control centers, etc. The largest control entities are Regional
Transmission Organizations (RTOs), with varying control over other entities in their region.
The RTOs were created by a federal committee hoping to regulate the flow of power supply
throughout a variety of independent companies.
Below the RTOs there is no uniform form of organization, but there may be varying levels
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of corporate participation between companies who have control over generation, transmis-
sion, distribution, or all three in a particular area.
This amorphous organizational structure means that rather than having explicitly regu-
lated interactions, these corporate entities must cooperate to get their jobs done and provide
the best service. This cooperation inherently conflicts with the secretive and mistrustful cor-
porate environment in which each entity must inherently be suspicious of their competitors.
Currently, the communication between these entities—and even between centers within the
same company—is vulnerable and the companies are quite interested in securing the various
interactions.
For the purposes of the thesis, I selected two connected protocols to be the basis for my
applications. However, there are a variety of possibilities out there.
2.1.1 Inter-Control Center Communication Protocol
There is an existing international standard, Inter-Control Center Communication Protocol
(ICCP) for communicating between power grid units, which is implemented in a variety
of different ways. Although details are of these implementations are difficult to come by,
it is common for the ICCP application to keep a table of permissions for a specific set of
interactions. There are officially nine different forms of interaction, which can be narrowed
to the following four categories: device control, general messaging, control of programs at a
remote control center, and exchanging time-critical data between control centers [29]. The
ICCP often runs as an overlay network on several control centers, so data and transactions
may pass through several node machines before coming to rest at the final destination.
There is clear support here for the ICCP to disallow requests of an unprivileged entity,
but there is no enforcement of ICCP itself to be running on a workstation. Thus, there
is little support for trust of the machines or of the data and computation that must pass
through them. All trust relationship are caught up in the structure of the network, even
when such relationships may not truly exist: there is no structural reason to trust a neighbor
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who says that they run ICCP. This is the level of security that Virtual Container Attestation
attempts to resolve, by providing assurance to these mutually distrustful entities that their
data and program operations are happening in a manner which enforces the properties they
desire.
In summary: the problem with the current implementation is such that a request can
leave a machine (the client), go to another machine (the host), and data can travel the other
direction with no assurance that the host is actually providing accurate data. While ICCP
seems to do well with access matrices at ensuring that requests come from validated people,
they do not do much validation of the data coming back, or the operation at either end.
2.1.2 OpenPDC: the open-source solution
OpenPDC—open source phasor data concentrator—is power grid software released by the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) with the intent to make it easy to manage, process, and
respond to changes in fast streams of data from the devices used in the power grid. This
includes all devices, not just phasors. Time-stamped data includes temperature, voltage,
location, etc, and gets merged with other input data as it goes through the application [1].
Although OpenPDC is written in such a way that I am unable to adapt it for direct use
in OpenSolaris, I was able to use it as the basis for the handful of testing applications created
for this project. Its adaptors are modular pieces of code which allow for mass processing
after the fact or data streaming through protocols such as the ICCP. See Figure 2.1 for the
full outline of PDC functionality.
2.1.3 Emerging Smart Grid Technology
One of the promising up-and-coming technologies in the power industry is that of the Smart
Grid. The Smart Grid focuses on bringing better service through a variety of new tech-
nology. Theoretically, this technology provides two-way support through sensors and smart
appliances which provide information to the power suppliers and users [13]. From the view
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Figure 2.1: Modular OpenPDC design, from http://openpdc.codeplex.com/
of the suppliers, they receive information that allows them to make more informed choices to
keep the grid running and more efficient. From the point of the users, the information allows
them to be more in touch with where their power is going within their home (for instance,
which appliances use disproportionate amounts of power) and where their power is coming
from: the grid hopes to provide support for alternative energy sources to the users.
Industry leaders hope this technology will lead to better management of power and
technology by providing users with utilities which report information to the control center
and react to changes in the power grid, to more efficiently utilize its resources. One proposed
service provides an itemized power bill to users, which compares their usage to those of their
neighbors, for context. Other propositions have been to create appliances that, for example,
only run the dishwasher when it is most efficient and power is at low demand. The power
companies have shown a willingness to create price incentives to encourage this behavior, in
which case consumers would get some idea of how their utilities and consumption patterns
affect their monthly bill.
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However, the amount of information gathered just to provide a single one of those ap-
plications is enormous, and without appropriate controls, the security and privacy issues
of this emerging technology are glaringly obvious. If I get an itemized bill comparing my
usage to Mr. Smith’s usage next-door, then that information has probably traveled through
a number of different hands, and the information may be accessible to a wide number of
people: allowing utter strangers (or Mr. Smith) to know my habits, including when and how
much I watch TV, microwave popcorn, or run the lights in my bathroom. Such information
can easily lead to other, more compromising vulnerabilities.
Such a network of Smart Grid utilities would involve an enormous amount of data col-
lection, aggregation, and redistribution. The path of this data has not been specified, but it
is commonly believed that the the utilities will report to a local network, which communi-
cates with data-collection servers, who then distribute the information to other entities both
inside and outside of the Smart Grid. I believe that my technology can provide sterile envi-
ronments where such collection can occur—allowing the Smart Grid technology to overhaul
our national power usage—but in a manner which allows each consumer to maintain their
privacy and security.
2.2 Motivating Scenarios
I have selected four real-world scenarios within the context of the power grid technology.
These scenarios represent the motivating scenarios for the thesis and demonstrate several
different uses for the Virtual Container Attestation technology.
Each scenario is an instance of the case where a user (client, Alice) is making use of a
virtual machine on another machine (host, Bob). Alice would like to be sure that Bob’s
machine is enforcing certain properties, and so she asks for attestation in return before the
operation commences.
In the following scenarios, Alice represents the client requesting a container from the host,
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Bob. When necessary, Carlos represents client2, who also interacts with the host container.
Mallory is, as usual, a malevolent force somewhere out in the internet. In one particular
application, Dave is an external authority, an auditor
2.2.1 Data Transfer
Alice requests data digests from Bob, but wishes to do the data processing on his machine.
The zone should have an external network connection so that it can send encrypted data
digests to Alice (and only Alice). Bob allows Alice to run her (provided) executable on his
machine, but watches for data corruption over the data he has let Alice see.
In the context of the power grid, this is the sort of thing that would run persistently
between two partner companies, or a generation and transmission company, sending Alice
periodic digests of Bob’s data. It requires little interaction with either party and is thus a
fairly simple application to monitor.
2.2.2 Program Control
Alice and Bob are companies at the same level of power organization (ie. transmission). For
whatever reason, they need to exchange control of a device. Alice needs access to some device
X. The physical connection to device X is attached to and managed by Bob’s computer. He
grants her a container on his server, with some restrictions.
When creating the container, he guarantees her container some percentage of his cpu
cycles. He allows her access to a variety of programs, and to the network, but he watches
to ensure that data corruption does not change the status of the device to a state which he















1. Device lives in main 
machine
2. This connection to the 
device creates log files
3. Data corruption mechanism checks
that log files remain uncorrupted
while digest is created: no input to dev
4. Encryption mechanism checks
that only (and all) outgoing digest
materials are encrypted
5. Network mechanism checks
that the connection only goes
to the appropriate person
Scenario #1: 
Alice(client) receives digests from Bob(host).
Checks for data corruption, encryption, and
network connection abnormalities.










1. Device lives in main 
machine
2. Commands are directed in, 
replies directed out through here
3. Data corruption mechanism checks
that log files remain uncorrupted.
Host needs uncorrupted copy.
5. Network mechanism checks
that the connection only goes
to the appropriate person
Scenario #2: 
Alice(client) controls a device hosted by Bob
Checks for data corruption, zone configuration, 
and network connection abnormalities.
Remote 
Zones
4. Zone configuration checks ensure 
that the commands to the device 
from the container will get CPU time
Figure 2.3: Scenario 2
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2.2.3 External Audit
Dave is an auditor, either externally or from a higher-level power grid organization that needs
access to a variety of data and device information, as well as the ability to investigate the
state of various devices. He is currently auditing Bob’s system and needs to be able to run
both his own code and some of Bob’s executables, and needs them to happen in a specific
order such that Bob cannot alter the outcome of the audit, but can provide information
as necessary. Additionally, Bob would like to ensure that Dave is not inserting anything
malicious into his executables, and that he does not change the device state.
Because Bob’s audit data is sensitive, particularly to his business, he would like Dave to
encrypt anything that leaves the server. However, Bob would also like to make sure that
Dave does not have the capability to encrypt any of Bob’s files, and hold them hostage until












1. Several devices live 
in main machine
4. Data corruption mechanism checks
that log files remain uncorrupted
while digest is created: no input to dev
5. Encryption mechanism checks
that only (and all) outgoing digest
materials are encryptedScenario #3: 
Dave(client) is audits the state of Bob(host).










2. Queries to all devs are directed in, 
replies directed out through here
Remote 
Zones
3. Control flow checks determine
whether Bob accesses the files
or changes the device state and
interferes with the audit
Figure 2.4: Scenario 3
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2.2.4 Smart Grid Data Aggregation
Bob is the data collection center for a section of Hanover, NH. Bob collects and aggre-
gates data from the main campus of Dartmouth College, as well as a number of residences,
churches, and business that lie within a short radius of the campus. All of the data will be
taken and used for power regulation purposes by Carlos, who has no need for identifying
information to be attached.
Alice, the owner of a residence just outside the college border, is concerned about who
gets her data. She fears that if Dartmouth gets the information, they can use it to somehow
get her to sell her land to them. She is also a bit concerned that Bob will give her information
to some advertising agents who see her habits and harass her with spam. But she likes the
idea of being able to see an itemized bill at the end of the month.
Bob does the data aggregation within a container on his server. Alice’s machines need
access to report in and get information back, and Carlos needs the data to provide better
service to his customers.
In this case, Bob requests the zone. He specifies a control flow that he expects the data
to take, such that anonymization happens after Alice’s operations have finished and before
Carlos jumps in. He isolates data structures that need to remain uncorrupted for valid
business or accounting purposes. In addition, he asks that the data going in and out must
be encrypted for Alice’s privacy.
2.2.5 Provenance of these applications
Each of these applications is based on actual examples of code or power grid interactions.
Most are based on openPDC code.
The first, data requests, is common in both the ICCP realm and openPDC. Data requests
between providers and within companies allow the load to remain balanced and internal
checks to be made. The enforcement in this scenarios prevents the host from modifying the












1. This connection to the 
device creates log files
2. Data corruption mechanism checks
that log files remain uncorrupted
between each level of interactions
4. Encryption mechanism checks
that only (and all) outgoing digest
materials are encrypted
Scenario #4: 
Alice(client) sends her data to Smart Grid collector Bob(host).
Checks for data corruption, control flow, and encryption




digests data for 
Carlos
3. Control flow mechanism checks
that log files remain uncorrupted
and untouched between each level
Figure 2.5: Scenario 4
she is getting data from. It explicitly protects against the attack of client-provided code
running amuck, and restricts it to a specific set of input processing.
The second, device control, is explicitly laid out in the openPDC code, and has some
minimal specifications in the ICCP. Again, it is common practice for device control to be
shared, particularly in border areas. The enforcement done in this scenario explicitly protects
against malicious use of the device, hiding the use of the device from the host, and delving
into data outside of the device.
The third, device auditing, receives peripheral attention in both the openPDC and the
ICCP and is essentially a more complicated form of the first scenario, data requests and
aggregation. The enforcement done in this scenario protects the accuracy of the information:
attacks of the host on the outcome of the audit. Additionally, it prevents the auditor from













Scenario 1 : Data Transfer X X X
Scenario 2 : Program Control X X X
Scenario 3 : External Audit X X X
Scenario 4 : Smart Grid Data Aggregation X X X
Table 2.1: Summary of application scenarios, as discussed in section 2.2.
Attrib 1 Basic cfg file restrictions. No network connection, for example,
or run-time specifications, specific mount points, etc.
Attrib 2 Network connection. Regulates “abnormal” network connec-
tions, or connections to people not in a pre-specified set.
Attrib 3 Control Flow. Regulates the control flow of a container to ensure
that the jobs originate from trusted or “normal” sources and
that, if a control flow is specified, it follows that flow.
Attrib 4 Data Corruption. Regulates specific userland data structures to
verify that they are modified only by the correct jobs and are
not morphing to something strange.
Attrib 5 Encryption. Verifies that encryption is being used in appropriate
places (for external communication) but that it is not being used
to send or capture information for nefarious purposes.
Table 2.2: Summary of attributes enforced in this thesis as discussed in section 2.2.
Finally, the fourth scenario has been explicitly laid out by the smart grid planning, and
has be historically pointed to as a significant privacy hole. [13] The enforcement protects the
accuracy of information for each stage (itemized billing, flow control, etc). It also ensures




3.1 Trusted Platform Module
The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a piece of hardware shipped with the machine. It is
designed specifically for secure operations and therefore has a number of special capabilities,
only some of which will be taken advantage of in this project.
The TPM is equipped to generate RSA keys, SHA-1 hashes, random numbers, and to
do limited encryption and decryption. The TPM supports storage of these keys as well as a
number of permanent keys granted at production and initialization of the TPM. Additionally,
the TPM supports the option to restrict use of such keys, explained below. It is important
to remember that the computational power of the TPM is limited and its role in encryption
and decryption should be somewhat limited.
The TPM has a number of Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) which provide
extendable data storage for the TPM. They cannot be written to, but only extended by
concatenating the new and old values together and storing a SHA-1 hash of value. They are
only cleared at reboot of the machine. Thus, the PCRs not only provide storage, but they
provide a record of the previous values.
TPM keys can easily be tied to a specific configuration of the machine by sealing them
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to a specific PCR value. This capability restricts usage of the key to the states where the
PCR values match the stored value for the key. Since the keys are stored in the TPM they
are not accessible outside and the TPM check against the PCR cannot be bypassed. This
capability also allows data to be sealed to a specific state or PCR value. The number of uses
for this sealing property are numerous.
The TPM is often used for trusted computing, and is in fact designed for it, since it
is an effective means of providing a ”trusted root”. The TPM can be wet up to perform
a trusted boot, wherein it evaluates each level of boot, from hardware to firmware, BIOS,
and bootloader, evaluations of which are stored in the PCRs. The TPM can continue to be
used for trusted computing by extending state into PCRS and wrapping keys or data to the
stored state. Thus, it becomes possible to only access that data or keypair when the state
matches the stored state: in other words, when the state is approved. In such a situation,
having access to the keys implies approved state for everything stored in the TPM.
I take advantage of these features for the Virtual Container Attestation code.
3.2 Solaris
Solaris is the operating system released by Sun (now Oracle) following SunOS, with the
capability to run on either SPARC or x86 processors. Although similar to Linux in form,
it has a number of differences, which make it quirky to code with. We chose this operating
system for a few reasons: its OS-level virtualization, runtime analysis tools, and its open-
source code.
Recently, much of the code for Solaris 10 was released as OpenSolaris, meaning that we
can delve into the operating system if required. For this project, I run in the current develop-
ment repository for OpenSolaris (dev-133 or 0.5.11-0.133 from http://pkg.opensolaris.org/dev).
While this allows me to take advantage of a number of features of the trusted computing
software stacks and TPM drivers, it unfortunately comes with the risk that such packages
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are not fully ready for release.
3.2.1 DTrace
The other main reason for using Solaris is DTrace. As a dynamic tracing method, DTrace
is invaluable. Its ability to dig into both user-and kernel-land code, as well as monitoring
syscalls and other attributes makes it ultimately one of the best tools we have on hand,


















Model of containers on OpenSolaris
Each container shares kernel files with the global zone
making this style of OS-level virtualization more lightweight
Figure 3.1: Zones, as represented in the OpenSolaris system.
3.2.2 Zones
The Solaris zones are an example of operating system-level virtualization, and as such, a
single kernel is shared among all of the zones. Applications thus see a guest container as
a standalone system, but only copy of Solaris is present on the machine. A single global
zone is persistent, always defined, and is the only zone which may access other zones. The
global zone encompasses all jobs present on the computer, regardless of whether they run in
34
a non-global zone or not, and may observe any process on the computer. Thus, our tools
run in the global zone and have access to the non-global zones.
Theoretically, the Solaris Zones are more lightweight and have a lower start-up time,
overhead, etc, than do normal forms of virtualization. Additionally, they do not run a
fully unique form of the operation system, thus reducing the software stack down to a more
manageable size. Sparse zones can be created which share most of the files with the global
zone, or whole-root zones, which contain copies of a subset of the files. Additionally, the
theoretical isolation provided between zones is ideal for our purposes: the only zone that can
observe other zones is the global (initial) zone, and therefore no client running in a container
(zone) will be able to peek into other system usage or containers, including the global zone.
The zones are created from configuration files which are easily parse-able and provide sev-
eral useful options for our project, including options to limit install options, network activity,
mount points and run-time resources. These are all properties that would be important to
monitor in creating sterile containers.
Although options such as Xen run at the hypervisor level, and therefore give up the
advantages of both observability and quick install from kernel-sharing, BSD jails are more
comparable to the Solaris containers. However, Solaris maintains an advantage over the
BSD alternative through heightened observability (through the global zone and DTrace),
as well as the easy configuration options and a more convenient method of zone creation,





To reiterate from section 1.2.6, the following are the capabilities of the Virtual Container
Attestation system created in this project.
1. It intercepts zone commands from within the operating system or users logged into
the machine itself and redirects them to the VMM-specific versions, which have more
checks and logging capabilities, particularly for container creation.
2. It accepts zone commands over an SSL-based service, and redirects those commands
to the VMM-specific versions. Additionally, this SSL server provides the means for
external clients to interact with non-networked zones.
3. It monitors specific attributes of the system and containers and halts zones which
do not comply with the the requested attributes. Such attributes are requested at
creation-time.
4. It employs PKI as a means of providing attestation via property-attributed certificates
that may be revoked to negate the attestation.
5. It utilizes secure hardware—the Trusted Platform Module—to ensure ensure that zones
whose certs have been revoked cannot continue to attest or to operate within the
system.
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The end goal of the project is twofold. On the one hand: we wish to create a means of
attesting to the state of a given remote zone, specifically to secure attributes of that zone.
Additionally, the machine should have some means of ensuring those attributes hold true,
and that the attestation matches the enforcement. We do the former through a chain of


























Each host can contain a large number of
containers, each with unique needs.
There is no need to halt all when one has a
violation, or keep all to the same rules
Figure 4.1: Variety of containers and purposes available with OpenSolaris.
4.1 Certificate Chain
The TPM is granted a certificate during manufacturing, as well as the ability to create other
keys, but not the ability to act as a certificate authority. However, the certificate granted
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during manufacture is the basis of our certificate chain. Our certificate chain builds from
here. An external certificate authority, run by a trusted third party, verifies the state of the
TPM, OS, and zone manager, allowing the zone manager to act as a certificate authority if
it passes inspection.
This zone manager then has its private key wrapped to the verified machine configuration
stored in the PCR values, and the private key is stored in the TPM volatile key storage.
Thus, if the machine changes state, the private key cannot be accessed. The zone manager
may then issue certificates to the individual zones, based on their attributes. The certificate
is issued for a relatively short period of time and is revoked if a zone is halted, and re-issued
upon start-up. For the purposes of the project, issuing certificates on the period of a couple
days was reasonable; for longer-running projects, the certificates could be issued for longer
time periods. The keys are stored in TPM volatile key storage, under the keys granted to the
TPM and the zone manager. The key is wrapped to the same value as the zone manager, and
between its binding and its subordination to the previous keys, it restricts the subordinate
keys to the system setups where the base application is working properly.
When a zone wishes to attest to its secure properties, it must only produce the certificate
granted by the zone manager, which contains a list of attributes, and prove knowledge of
the private key by signing the certificate. If the process fails because the key is inaccessable
or the certificate has been revoked, the client knows either the machine, the zone service,
or the zone itself has been compromised at some point (or at least has violated one of the
property attributes).
There are a number of actions that can happen if there is a failure higher up the chain.
The design decision of this thesis was to revoke all the certificates dependent on the parent
cert: a failure of the zone manager leads to an invalid setting for all zones. While this is
perhaps overly harsh, in the case where we only implement one revocation policy, we decided
that erring on the side of caution is more important.





1. Extend PCRs 
2. Verify state with TTP
3. Create CA
4. Bind CA Keys to state
5. Initialize zone database
5a. Initialize clonable zone
      (optional)
6. Set up SSL server to
     receive requests
7. Close all connections
8. Shutdown SSL server
9. Halt all zones
10. Revoke all certs
11. Remove all zone files
12. Clear and free zone
      database
Figure 4.2: The long-term creation and destruction of global state.
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4.2 External Certificate Authority and OS Repository
A third party external certificate authority is established prior to any use of the TPM
for Virtual Container Attestation usage. This certificate authority also has access to a
repository of accepted hardware/firmware/operating system evaluations. It has the authority
to grant the zone manager Certificate Authority capabilities, and provides some level of
standardization across all instances of the Virtual Container Attestation hosts.
The operations at the trusted third party are relatively simple, accepting a connection,
comparing the PCR values to known values, and making a trust decision based on that,
returning both answer and key if needed.
4.3 TPM initialization
The TPM, aided by the driver and low-level software, evaluates itself, the other hardware,
BIOS, boot-loader, etc at boot time, storing these evaluations in specific PCRs inside the
TPM itself. However, these values alone have no meaning or ability to create secure usage.
Something external to the TPM must do this for us, and in this case that is the trusted third
party.
For this project, we will store additional evaluations of specific parts of the operating
system into PCRs. Specifically, we store evaluations of a selection of zone utilities (generally
prefaced by zoneadm or zonecfg) in addition to the evaluation of the code in our tools, to
ensure that the zones are in complete isolation and that our enforcement of attributes is
correct. As clarification, the evaluation we most often talk about here is a SHA-1 hash.
These evaluations form the base measurements evaluated by the External Certificate
Authority: without having some assurance of these utilities, we cannot make any assumptions
about the rest of this chain, and as discussed above, they are required for the creation and
release of any other keys.
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4.4 Virtual Container Attestation Zone Manager
At the core of the project lies the Virtual Container Attestation Zone Manager (VZM). At
a basic utilitarian level, the VZM acts as a coordinator for the attested zones. It receives
and processes requests for creation and removal of VCA zones, and it acts an intermediate
between any zone interaction and the zone itself. It is, in short, a buffer between the zones
and external influences. (The exception being a handful of cases where the zone will have
network access to the outside world, in which case the traffic in that connection is closely
monitored.) This VZM also has more a more complicated role as a means of ensuring the
validity both of the state of the machine and the protections on any given zone.
For simplicity of implementation, and without loss of generality, we assumed that all
non-global zones on the machine were attested zones (or could be run as such with a null set
of security properties).












1. Create Zone 2. Install Zone
Installed
Halt zone
Figure 4.3: Lifecycle of a Solaris zone.
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11. Uninstall zone












13. Remove all zone files
4. Spawn enforcement
5. Create certificates
6. Bind to TPM
Figure 4.4: Lifecycle of a Virtual Container Attestation zone.
We go into more detail about the VZM below.
4.4.1 Certificate Authority
Once validated through the TPM and the external certificate authority, the VZM acts as a
certificate authority itself, granting attribute certificates to the individual zones. The keys
for the CA will remain sealed to state in the TPM, meaning that if the core code for the
zone manager changes, the certificate chain will be broken.
This service is perhaps the simplest to implement, and yet lies at the core of the process,
since the certificate chain is the means of attestation we have chosen to provide.
4.4.2 Enforcement Methods
A series of utilities run at the same time as the main zone manager code, maintaining the
properties and taking appropriate measures should things be violated.
For simplicity of design, we implemented only one policy for dealing with zones whose
attributes fail: we halt the zone and revoke the certificate. While other policies may easily
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be implemented, for the scope of this project, we felt this was appropriate.
Current zone enforcement mechanisms range from the simplest checking of the zone config
files to the more complicated ones involving external checks.
Zone config file checks run prior to zone creation. They are just internal consistency
checks, more for the host than the client. The client should specify a cfg file that satisfies
her config-level requirements, and the host simply checks that it also matches his. Examples
of such checks are network connectivity, cputime guarantees, mount points, etc.
Network Connectivity checks run concurrent with the active zone, to ensure that any
abnormal network activity (either too much, of an abnormal sort, or encrypted when it
should not be) is stopped in its tracks. A few examples of these checks are those that check
the destination and frequency of the network traffic leaving a zone.
This enforcement is moot in some cases where the zone is not allowed to connect to the
outside world, except through the original SSL remote zones connection.
Data Corruption periodically checks data vital to userland (zone) applications, to ensure
that no data is morphing in unexpected ways. Sometimes these data corruption checks
look at files. This ties in well with Control Flow checking, which monitors when and where
specific programs get executed or called. For example, one of our scenarios mandates that
executables get called in a specific order, and presumably by someone specific.
Both of these checks are reliant on the userland application provided. We have a number
of applications provided that create specific instances to check these enforcements. They lie
as close to the specifications as possible, and where possible we tried to use actual code from
the power grid, or close descriptions of the interactions.
Encryption An interesting, but less common problem is the encryption of data to either
hold it hostage or to do other sneaky things with sensitive data. By tracking the encryption
capabilities and actions of the zone, we keep an eye on these situations.
In cases where sensitive data is being exchanged or being sent over the wire, the host
—and often the client—would like encryption to be used. On the other hand, the host also
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wants to be sure that if the client is playing with sensitive data, it does not remove that
data from the host’s access. By tracking the encryption going on in a zone, we are able to
minimize the cases of insufficient external encryption or restrictive internal encryption.
Design of Enforcement
Most of the enforcement mechanisms run monitoring via some form of DTrace and report
to the security monitor based on the information gathered therein. These are persistent
processes, most of which watch a single container and do no revocation themselves. We chose
to have enforcement be enacted with a modular approach due to the potentially flexible set
of security properties required. With this design, future modules may be installed, allowing
a further extension to the security capabilities.
In addition to the modular format, there a handful of interceptions that take place,
discussed immediately below.
4.4.3 Zone Commands
Zone command will remain mostly unchanged from those normally called in an OpenSolaris
system. However, because the Zone manager acts as a buffer between the outside world
and the zones, it may make slight changes and checks on the calls to zone commands. In
particular, interception before the creation of a zone is important to guarantee the that the
zone created is compliant with and registered in the database of VCA zones, for future checks
and enforcement utilities, as discussed below.
4.4.4 Other Utilities
A number of other utilities run to check various things, mostly having to do with the setup
of the zone. Currently unimplemented is a utility to check the basic configuration file of
the zone for anything untoward. In the same vein, but implemented at this time is a utility
to check the configuration file, extracting all pieces related to the attribute requests. This
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information is given to the zone manager as the basis for attribute certificates and as a check
against enforcement mechanisms.
4.5 Outside Interaction
Connected with the VCA is a service running over SSL that accepts requests for the creation
of VCA zones, and allows remote commands to be directed to them. As the network connec-
tions between VCA zones and the outside world may be limited, we assume that much of the
interaction is done through this mechanism. Due to the SSL encryption, we know that those
making requests must be trusted to some degree. This interface allows the remote user to
create, destroy, and interact with zones from afar, and all commands have basic checks run
on them before execution. Once a zone is created, its identifier allows the remote client to
interact with the zone as through a shell, albeit with other modifications and checks inside.
4.6 Design Rationale: The Big Picture
Now that we have discussed the small pieces to the toolset, we discuss the larger picture and
how these pieces fit together. At the point, we would also like to remind the reader that this
system has been implemented and code is available upon request.
The first time the Virtual Container Attestation code is instantiated on a machine, or
when the machine is rebooted, the TPM initializes itself, extends the PCR values with
those of selected operating system evaluations, and measurements of the Virtual Container
Attestation code itself. These PCR values are then sent to a trusted third party, which gives
the virtual machine monitor the ability to grand certificates.
At this point, an SSL service is opened on the machine, and a database initialized to hold
the information about the containers. When a container is requested via SSL its configuration
and requests are checked, the requests are parsed and removed from the config file, registered
in the database as a VCA zone, and its attributes are logged. If the machine currently meets
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the requirements, keys and certs are created, and the enforcement policies are spawned to
watch the zone. If any of the enforcement processes report an error, or access to the key is
lost, the certificate is revoked and the entry in the database is marked as invalid.
Depending on the setup of the zone, future interactions may occur through the SSL
connection, or may happen through a networked connection provided in the zone. Either
way, a close eye is kept on the commands and monitor is persistent through the life of the
zone.
Remote Zones
(written in C, modified for VCA)
1. Establish SSL server 
2. Handle client requests
3. Redirect commands/replies via pipes
Zone Creation Scripts    
(bash scripting, zonecfg, zoneadm)




PKI Scripts    
(bash scripting, openssl)
1. Initialize CA
2. Request zone keys
3. Add properties and request certificate
4. Revoke certificate
TPM Code  
(written in C, uses TSPI and TSS stacks)
1. Extend PCRs to contain state
2. Extract state to verify  
3. Seal CA keys to state
4. Wrap OpenSSL keys with TPM keys,
seal to state
Unifying VCA Code
(written in C, linked )
1. Unifies zone operations.
2. Ties zones to PKI, TPM, and enforcement
3. Maintains database of both VCA and non-VCA zones
4. Receives notice of zone violation
5. Kickstarts revocation process
Zone Enforcement Tools 
(bash, C, dTrace, other tools)
1. Basic configuration checking
2. Network checking
3. Data corruption checking
4. Control flow checking
5. Encryption checking
Trusted Third Party
1. Check VCA evaluation
Figure 4.5: The structure of our solution. The white sections are those which were available





For the purposes of providing a reasonable thesis basis, we restricted ourselves to four main
properties to enforce, and came up with a number of scenarios which mandated we check
those properties. However, the results are extensible to more properties.
A short description of the testing and evaluation of our implementation follows.
5.1 Testing Applications
For this thesis, we have a handful of applications run on top of the Virtual Container At-
testation tools, both to test the concept and to provide some performance measure. Each
of the scenarios from section 2.2 became a test application for the evaluation of the project.
Each of these applications tests at least two of the enforcement mechanisms that we have
established.
Because of the closed nature of the power-grid, and the experimental nature of the smart
grid, these applications were created specifically for the thesis. We were able to get our
hands on one application currently in use, but it could not be adapted to the OpenSolaris
platform. However, being able to see inside the application allowed us to tie our applications
to real-world situations and code design, thus using that for more rigorous testing of our
tools.
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5.2 Evaluation of Virtual Container Attestation
To test the implementation of our Virtual Container Attestation tools, we considered the
scenarios as described in 2.2, but also ran a number of other tests to ensure that the system
behaved as expected.
1. We qualitatively evaluated the behavior of the system under a variety of creation
requests (some rather far-fetched) and basic interactions within those zones.
2. We also tested whether the system would appropriately enforce the qualities we gave
it, by creating zones and intentionally causing revocation scenarios.
3. In addition, we gave those same zones working input to established Virtual Container
Attestation zones to ensure that under ideal conditions the zones would run well for
an extended period of time.




6.1 Challenges to the Implementation
6.1.1 Solaris Containers
At the beginning of the project we believed that the Solaris Containers would provide a very
lightweight form of virtual machine that would be ideal for the dynamic and flexible creation
we had in mind for Virtual Container Attestation. Unfortunately, this turned out to not be
the case. The Solaris containers go through a number of stages before they run, including
created, installed, and ready. The installation phase, during which necessary operating system
files are copied over, is far too long for our purposes here. On the order of about three to
five minutes is a common installation time.
Despite our best efforts at looking into why this would be the case and what we could
change to provide a more speedy interface, it turns out that there is little that can currently
be done. We were able to achieve a marginal speedup using a clone option for the zones,
which works well for closely-related zones. However, cloning zones is not ideal.
Over the course of some discussion with Sun, it became clear that Solaris containers have
a faster startup than their OpenSolaris alternatives, and the capability for this to occur may









Zone Creation Times (split)
Figure 6.1: Time split for the creation times of various stages. Typical figures shown.
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6.1.2 Communication with Zones
The communication with zones is still somewhat clunky, as we have to deal with the dual
concerns of isolating the non-global zones from each other, controlling every movement and
information exchange, against the concern of being able to communicate with the containers,
specifically those for whom a network connection was disallowed. Currently, this is done via
the built-in methods for doing so, but there are significant downsides to doing so, as it limits
the style of command that can go through to the restricted zones.
6.1.3 Driver and Software Stack Difficulties
Because the TPM and other trusted computing notions are relatively recent to the OpenSo-
laris platform, there are a number of difficulties within the drivers and software stack relating
to these issues.
Mainly, some exits are handled poorly, leading to residual bad state in the system, and
the incapacitation of future operations. While these bugs have been reported to Sun, in
the meantime I have done my best to avoid such instances. Unfortunately for the Virtual
Container Attestation system, not all instances are avoidable, leading to unpredictable issues
within the software.
6.2 Results of Evaluation
6.2.1 Creation Requests and Basic Event Handling
The overall implementation of Virtual Container Attestation was a success, leading to a
successful and useful system, with a few caveats noted above. Alteration of the Remote
Zones code given to us, as well as the addition of TPM and PKI capabilities led to smooth
creation and command handling within the VCA framework.
Specifically, the capability to start the system using trusted boot, extend PCRs, initialize
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state, and accept clients happens without a hitch. Clients are successfully accepted, their
requests are parsed and created, with appropriate properties. We have options to work from
either installed zones or cloned zones, and both integrate well with the system.
Commands and replies also transpire without any problem: from the client’s viewpoint,
it appears as if one is interacting with a slightly different terminal, but with essentially the
same capabilities.
Property-based identity certificates are provided with clear properties and elucidation
about the specific requests included in the certificate itself. This simplified attestation im-
proves vastly over previous solutions: a few lines of reading in the certificate make it clear
what the status of the zone is. According to the policy implemented, revocation of those
certificates is simultaneous with the shutdown of the zone.
See Figure 6.2 for a comparison of scalability within OpenSolaris and Xen. Clearly,
OpenSolaris scalability far surpasses that of Xen. This is a great benefit in situations such
as the power grid, wherein a single provider many want to talk with hundreds of clients
at a given time, and have a reasonable response time. Note that depending on workload,
numbers for both products may be somewhat lower.
6.2.2 Enforcement of Properties and Revocation
Enforcement being the main target of this approach, it received the most testing during the
evaluation of the system. Property enforcement indeed works with this system, such that
the enforcement continues for an indeterminate period of time, and halts the zone within a
reasonable period of time of a violation, cascading into certificate revocation.
There is a performance hit associated with doing such enforcement, although it is rela-
tively minor, due to the nature of DTrace. We did not specifically measure performance for
this project.
The modular design of the enforcement means that additional properties can be evaluated










Figure 6.2: Scalability of OpenSolaris zones as opposed to Xen.
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installation of modules is simple, but not brainless, as a handful of parameters must change.
6.2.3 Potential Security Weaknesses
Unfortunately, the Solaris isolation is not complete. While the global zone’s window into
non-global zone operations is useful for this project, it does provide a vulnerability if code
running into the zones can gain access to the zone, through tricking the filesystem or some
other method.
Additionally, DTrace does have some time of check vs time of use (TOCTOU) issues
which makes it possible for each vulnerability to have a momentary window of freedom
before the monitor detects the misuse of the zone.
6.2.4 Code Availability
Code and documentation are available upon request to katelin.a.bailey.10@alum.dartmouth.org
6.3 Future Work
As always, with research, there are areas not within the scope of this project which would
be interesting, necessary, or otherwise good to investigate further or take the research in a
different direction. We discuss these areas below.
6.3.1 Varied Revocation Scheme
For the purpose of this thesis, I restricted the revocation scheme to a particularly harsh one
which revokes the certificate, denies access to the private key, and halts the compartment
at fault. It would be interesting work to allow a more flexible revocation scheme, or allow
communication with the client that attempts to resolve issues.
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6.3.2 Additional Security Checks
There are a number of security checks that went unimplemented in this version of the tools
that would be useful or interesting to have in future iterations, among them the ability to
translate between human specifications and configuration files, and the ability to have a
simple check of a configuration file to see if it matches with the host’s security policy. While
the latter is partially implemented, it is a very rough attempt, and a further expansion would
be warranted.
6.3.3 Negotiation of Security
Even with the property-based specification of the security desired, there is likely to be some
mismatch of desires between host and client. It would be wonderful to get a negotiation
mechanism built into the initial SSL handshake to automate some of the back-and-forth
necessary to come to an agreement.
6.3.4 Communication with Zones
As discussed previously, the communication with the zones is a bit clunky. Further research
along these venues should address that issue within the kernel itself.
6.4 Conclusions
This thesis concludes with a working prototype of the design specified. It is, however, merely
a prototype. Limitations in the technology provided, as well as areas of future work make
it clear that such an implementation is not practical in use today. Nonetheless, if work
continues in this direction, there is significant potential for the solution to become practical
in the near future. At that point, we expect this solution to be more usable and secure than
the alternatives currently available.
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